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Emotion, after a long period of inattention, began to attract greater scrutiny as a key driver of human behavior 
in the mid-1980s. One approach that has achieved significant influence in political science is affective 
intelligence theory (AIT). We deploy AIT here to begin to understand the recent rise in support for right-wing 
populist leaders around the globe. In particular, we focus on specific emotional appraisals on elections held at 
periods of heightened threat, including the two 2015 terror attacks in France, as influences on support for the 
far-right Front National among conservatives. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, we speculate that threats 
can generate both anger and fear, and with very different political consequences. We expect fear to inhibit 
reliance on extant political dispositions such as ideological identification and authoritarianism, while anger 
will strengthen the influence of these same dispositions. Our core findings, across repeated tests, show that fear 
and anger indeed differentially condition the way habits of thought and action influence support for the far right 
in the current historical moment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is anger that mobilizes the far right and 
authoritarians. Fear, on the other hand, diminishes the impact of these same dispositions.
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“I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the 
will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will. …Reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and obey them.” (Hume, 1984, pp. 460–462)
Most behavioral theories of voting in liberal democracies are based on social psychological 
accounts developed in the middle of the last century. These accounts remain highly influential. 
They have been generated by scholars speculating about what happens inside the “black box” of the 
human brain. However, they lead to empirical and normative conclusions that seem to us suspect. For 
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example, if we all simply code our experiences along a single dimension from positive to negative, 
as the “affective tally” approach by Lodge and Taber (2013) suggests, why do the distinct negative 
reactions—fear and anger—have different effects on political behavior? One answer is provided by 
affective intelligence theory (AIT), which makes predictions about why people sometimes aban-
don extant loyalties to candidates, policies, and parties and why they sometimes strengthen those 
commitments. The evidence we present below supports a different explanation than is commonly 
presented for the recent rise in popularity of far-right parties and politicians in several advanced 
democracies around the globe.
The theory of affective intelligence (Marcus, 2002; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) has 
long focused on the association of emotional reactions to information-seeking and decision-making 
processes. That is, whether people seek more or less contemporary information and how they then 
make use of that information (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Gadarian & Albertson, 2014; Marcus & 
MacKuen, 1993; Suhay & Erisen, 2018). These inquiries confront two common claims that derive 
from the long-held belief that reasoning is the foundation of free will, generally, and, in particular, 
to the public’s capacity to engage in self-governance.
The first claim is that the sole appropriate basis for human agency, that is, free will, is reliant on 
our “higher” cognitive functions (Kant, 1970). The second is that emotion’s principle purpose is to 
serve as a passive storage mechanism of positive or negative evaluations of political attitude objects 
(Allport, 1935; Converse, 1966; McGuire, 1969).
The theory of affective intelligence has over past decades been focused on two related research 
areas: the role of anxiety in prompting political learning (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Gadarian 
& Albertson, 2009, 2014; Groenendyk, 2016; MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Marcus & 
MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007; Suhay & 
Erisen, 2018; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008) and in prompting the shift to a more de-
liberative style of political judgment (Brader, 2006; Groenendyk, 2016; Ladd & Lenz, 2008; Marcus, 
Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Valentino et al., 2008).
There has been a normative consequence to this body of research. By demonstrating that the 
public has the capacity to become informed and moved to a deliberative and open form of reasoning 
in making political judgments, AIT suggests that the public comes closer to meeting democratic 
theory’s standards of citizenship than most empirical researchers believe is possible (Marcus, 2002).
The broad pattern of research suggests that greater fear leads to explicit deliberation on thought-
ful contemporaneous information that meets a central standard set forth by deliberative democracy 
theorists (Benhabib, 1996; Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Dryzek, Bächtiger, & Milewicz, 2011; Elster & 
Przeworski, 1998; Fishkin, 1991). But, as we discuss more fully below, contemporary information of 
a different sort is also required to enable a second form of political judgment. This form of judgment 
achieves results by relying on contemporaneous sensory data that is matched to already mastered 
efficacious routines of thought and action to effectively deal with familiar noxious threats.
We apply AIT to challenge a common view that posits that fear drives the public to endorse hi-
erarchy and traditional practices especially in reaction to threats (Nussbaum, 2018; Robin, 2004).1  
We depart from the common view in two ways. First, we do not think that exposure to threat will 
necessarily trigger fear alone. Instead, anger is often the predominant emotional reaction in many 
threatening circumstances. Second, our approach posits that each of the two specific emotional ap-
praisals of a threat leads to very different downstream behavioral consequences.
1This view has a far more ancient precursor. At least in the west, both the Jewish and Christian testaments endorsed god’s 
wrath as the principal mechanism by which otherwise sinful people would be moved to accept the dogma and show proper 
compliance and fealty. Even today, the phrase “god fearing people” is commonly used by Christian adherents as a term of 
approbation. And with Hobbes (2005) comes a secularized version of that same story: the Leviathan is properly justified in 
using terror though only sufficient to keep the unruly in line. It is only with the regime of terror initiated by the Jacobins 
after the French Revolution that the normative stance of the term “terror” begins its shift to current defamatory status 
(Schechter, 1998).
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The view that threats raise fear and fear inevitably leads to the endorsement of far-right parties 
and policies (Bude, 2018; Nussbaum, 2018) is commonly voiced by politicians. In response to a terror 
attack in lower Manhattan, Governor Cuomo (2017) proclaimed: “The effort yesterday killed eight 
people, but in my opinion the effort failed, because the effort was not to kill eight people. The effort 
was to destruct us, to terrorize us, to scare us, to create mayhem. That’s the effort. That’s the goal 
on all of these attacks.” And, more recently still, in a speech to Congress, April 25, 2018, French 
President Emmanuel Macron put it thusly: “We have two possible ways ahead. We can choose isola-
tionism, withdrawal and nationalism. … It can be tempting to us as a temporary remedy to our fears. 
But closing the door to the world will not stop the evolution of the world. It will not douse, but in-
flame the fears of our citizens.” Or as former Vice President Al Gore put it (Gore, 2004): “Terrorism 
is the ultimate misuse of fear for political ends. Indeed, its specific goal is to distort the political 
reality of a nation by creating fear in the general population that is hugely disproportionate to the 
actual dangers that the terrorists are capable of posing” (p. 779). Thus, a general consensus has been 
in place for many years that high-threat conditions drive people to press for authoritarian policies 
and strong, traditional leaders (McCann, 1997).
As we elaborate below, we anticipate that politicized dispositions, of which authoritarianism is 
but one, are more likely to be activated by anger rather than by fear. Earlier studies have shown that 
threat activates authoritarianism, mobilizing authoritarians to act in line with their psychological 
predispositions (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). AIT posits that this activation depends on 
whether the threatening stimulus generates predominantly anger. More generally, it claims that all 
politicized dispositions are more likely to be activated by anger and that fear functions to deactivate 
those same dispositions.
It is our goal in the sections that follow to fully articulate the core ideas underlying conventional 
accounts of emotion and politics. By doing so, we hope to make visible the often hidden presump-
tions that many bring to the word “emotion.” We thereafter turn from theoretical exposition to em-
pirical research. AIT extends our understanding of how people make political decisions and act on 
them. We use the topic of threat to assess our theoretical claim that fear generally weakens support 
for far-right policies and candidates by weakening the extant commitment of those otherwise habit-
ually inclined to vote for the right and far right. We also advance and test the theoretical argument 
that anger is the predominant activating mechanism of those on the right.
A Brief History of Emotion in Political Science and Psychology
It is common to treat words as if they identify straightforward features of the world. Yet, words 
can be slippery things with shifting meanings that produces scientifically imprecise measurement 
and theory (Wittgenstein & Ogden, 1990). Our goal in this section is to seek precision and clarity 
when we discuss what we and others mean by the term “emotion.”2  Three models of emotion have 
been applied to theories of political behavior and political judgment over the past 70 years.3  The 
oldest is attitude theory. Cognitive appraisal theories began to emerge in the 1970s. And, finally, 
AIT emerged in the late 1980s (Marcus, 1988; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & 
MacKuen, 2000).4 
2Many may not know that “emotion” is a rather late entry into the semantic language as an overarching category encompass-
ing what had long been understood as passion, desire, or sentiment (Dixon, 2006).
3Of course scholars have long been examining passion (Descartes, 2012; Montagu, 1994; Montesquieu, 1989; Rorty, 1993; 
Stiker, 1987), but by the term “models,” we mean effort to apply contemporary scientific, empirical, claims to testing with 
various modes of data. We do not discuss Freud’s psychoanalytic views for lack of space.
4We also set aside the body of research that can best be described as the “circumplex” model which emerged in the late 
1970s and extended to the 1990s (Plutchik & Conte, 1997; Russell, 1980; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984). We discuss it 
more fully elsewhere (Marcus, 2003).
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Attitude Theory and Emotion
Attitude theory served as the basis for the “Normal Vote” explanation for electoral behavior 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1966). The approach presented affect as one 
of the tripartite components in an attitude. The other two are the cognitive—what we know about a 
political object—and the behavioral—what we do with or about the attitude target. In attitude theory, 
the affect component has two primary features: one dealing with function and one dealing with struc-
ture. The function of affect in attitude theory is to serve as a passive repository for an approach-liking 
–avoid-disliking evaluation, that is, to serve as an “affective tag” (Ajzen, 2001; Allport, 1935; Fiske 
& Taylor, 1991; McGuire, 1969). That evaluation follows from what we know about the target, that is, 
the cognitive component is a necessary predicate for generating the affective component.
In this approach, affect was defined as a single valence dimension, ranging from strong liking 
to strong disliking. This is similar to the measurement of many other matters of perception (e.g., 
perceptions of threat related to such things as Pearl Harbor or 9/11 in the United States, and the 
November 13 Paris Terror attacks in France on a single metric ranging from low to high).5  This uni-
dimensional conception of affect remains active in the widespread use of feeling thermometers de-
ployed in influential surveys such as the American National Election Studies (Kenney & Rice, 1988; 
Klein, 1991; Wilcox, Sigelman, & Cook, 1989).
In summary, we have identified one central claim made by attitude theory: that affective reac-
tions can be treated as a single dimension that signals whether it is best to approach or to avoid a 
stimulus (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
Cognitive Appraisal Theories of Emotion
Reducing emotional experience to a single dimension seems counterintuitive, since a great variety 
of distinct negative and positive emotional reactions are easy to identify in everyday life. Indeed, an 
abundance of empirical research soon arose to challenge the conjecture of unidimensionality in atti-
tude theory (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Tellegen, 
Watson, & Clark, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Cognitive appraisal theorists subsequently pro-
posed that emotions existed in many different “discrete” states such as anger, fear, hope, pride, disgust, 
and sadness. There are several versions, differing largely on the number of discrete emotions, from a 
low of 7 or 8 to a high of more than 22. The general approach was intended to understand the distinct 
causal etiology of affective experiences well beyond the single positive-negative valence view.
Most cognitive appraisal theories retain the presumption passed down from attitude theory that 
at any given moment the individual will normally experience predominantly one emotion (Clore & 
Ortony, 2008; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). This presumption derives from the 
means by which we are thought to experience an emotion. The process is the application of a sequence 
of cognitive evaluations of the threats and opportunities present in our environment in the moment (see 
Figure 1). That is, various cognitive considerations about what is happening and how we should best 
react are sequentially applied. On exposure to a stimulus, the individual determines if its implications 
are positive or negative; then, certain or uncertain; controllable or not, and so on, with the particular ap-
praisals deemed important varying from theory to theory. Emotion then flows from the particular se-
quence of cognitions that occurs one after the other (McGuire, 1969, 1972). In this sense, all cognitive 
appraisal theories are consistent with attitude theory’s view of perception. In the case of attitude theory, 
the result is a feeling state that falls somewhere along a single liking-disliking dimension. In the case of 
cognitive appraisal theories, the result is a discrete affective state, such as hope, fear, anger, or sadness.
5The development of a psychology informed by neuroscientific research points to many concepts thought to be singular as 
better understood as complex. For example, Decety and Norman (2018) point to empathy as such a case wherein a number 
of concurrent assessments combine to foster more, or less, empathy.
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There have been instances wherein research conducted under the guise of cognitive appraisal 
report multiple concurrent affective reactions. For example, Conover and Feldman (1986) find that 
people report independent positive and negative reactions to the economy during the Reagan years. 
And Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (2007) report that both anxiety and anger can be generated by 
terrorist attacks. Further, some cognitive appraisal theorists acknowledge that people can experience 
several emotions during a singular event (Lazarus, 1991). Notwithstanding those departures from 
the norm, the prospect of multiple recurring affective appraisals is left largely undertheorized by 
cognitive appraisal researchers.6 
There is one accommodation that has been more fully explored. Most, and perhaps all, scholars 
accept the existence of ambivalence. However, that term has been applied broadly to describe the 
holding of conflicting policy positions, or of conflicting beliefs, as well as to experiencing conflict-
ing emotions (Craig & Martinez, 2005; Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012; Priester & Petty, 
1996). The term “ambivalence” strictly means having contrary beliefs or feelings, with “bi” referring 
to direct opposition, presumptively positive and negative beliefs, positions, or feelings. Even those 
attending to the possibility of multiple conflicting feelings accept the premise that such instances are 
not the norm. Moreover, ambivalence does not encompass, as we argue below, conflicting negative 
affective appraisals as normal and consequential.
We can see this clearly in Figure 1. Here we present Ira Roseman’s depiction of his version of 
cognitive appraisal theory (Roseman, 1984, p. 31). The figure displays the evident considerations 
and their application to define his understanding of the discrete emotions that he identifies and the 
sequence (top to bottom) of serial cognitive appraisals that lead to each discrete state. Which of those 
6By undertheorized we mean that cognitive appraisal theories have not offered an account, with one exception which we 
deal with next, of why, when, and to what effect such multiple affective appraisals occur (or further, specifying which affec-
tive appraisals might co-occur). The acknowledgment that affective occurrences are typically multidimensional, rather than 
affectively homogenous, arose in the research literature well before any cognitive appraisal theorists paid notice (Abelson 
et al., 1982; Watson et al., 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999; Zevon & Tellegen, 
1982).
Figure 1. An example of cognitive appraisal theory’s representation of affective states. Source : Adapted from Roseman 
(1984, p. 31).
Positive Emotions Negative Emotions
Circumstance-
Caused
Motive-Consistent
Appetitive | Aversive
Motive-Inconsistent
Appetitive | Aversive
Unknown Surprise
Uncertain Hope Fear
Weak
Certain Joy Relief Sadness Distress, Disgust
Uncertain Hope
Frustration Strong
Certain Joy Relief
Other-Caused
Unknown
Liking
Dislike Weak
Uncertain
Certain
Anger Strong
Uncertain
Self-Caused
Unknown
Pride
Shame, Guilt Weak
Uncertain
Certain
Regret Strong
Uncertain
114 Marcus et al.
basic discrete states any of us experiences at any given moment depends on how those intermediate 
cognitive appraisals play out.
A Brief Critique of Emotion as Understood in Cognitive Appraisal Theories
Our main critique of cognitive appraisal theories is that they insist on a fairly strict, and often 
quite elaborate, sequential cognitive process that precedes the experience of any emotion. For exam-
ple, most appraisal theories suggest anger requires a set of cognitive appraisals identifying both ma-
levolent and intentional threats, in addition to an evaluation of how likely the individual is to mount 
a response. It is often claimed that fear is caused initially by exposure to any threat and then is trans-
formed to anger when the individual discovers that some norm was intentionally violated (Salmela & 
von Scheve, 2017). Our approach is more consistent with the most recent neuropsychological findings 
of brain architecture, which suggests that emotion springs from distinct though interconnected brain 
circuitry such that different emotions can be experienced simultaneously and in parallel. Further, 
neuroscience suggests distinct emotional states such as anxiety, anger, and enthusiasm occur without 
prior intervention of a distinct prior cognitive appraisal (Adolphs, 2008; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1995; Chen et al., 2009; Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Straube et al., 2010; Zajonc, 1980, 1984).
We have other concerns as well. Emotion words in the English language number in the hundreds 
(Clore & Ortony, 1988; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1998; Storm & Storm, 1987). Further, the number 
and nuance varies across languages. This raises a challenge. Which of the many words warrant 
treatment as “discrete” emotional states and which may be treated as synonymous? Many English 
language emotion words can readily be construed as synonymous. Yet many may also be understood 
as naming different underlying emotional states. What enables us to define when the words name 
different emotions versus the same emotion state? What, apart from the authority of the scholar, or 
some semantic tradition, affords some standard psychometrically valid criterion (Cowen & Keltner, 
2017; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2017)?
Finally, both theoretical approaches above have been largely uninformed by neuroscience re-
search on emotions. Before we turn to AIT, we think it useful to lay out the core insights of neurosci-
ence into how human brains function that should inform all theories of emotion and politics (Gray, 
1987b; LeDoux, 1992, 1996; Öhman, 1993; Rolls, 1999, 2005).
A Necessary Interlude: Some of the Essential Contributions of Neuroscience to the Study of 
Emotion and Politics
The burgeoning research in neuroscience on emotion has, to date, not yet had widespread impact 
across the many fields of political science. We next present one self-executing exercise that displays 
what research in neuroscience tells us about how the brain functions that challenges one of the assump-
tions embedded in the conventional wisdom about the human experience of reality. Our main goal is to 
provoke the reader’s willingness to keep an open mind with regard to our general approach of having 
emotional experience as the foundation of all information processing, decision-making, and behavior.
As we have discussed above, ancient belief holds that thinking is the central actor in human 
judgment and action. Thinking rules, and if sometime we let our “hearts” get in the way, that lapse 
reflects badly on our character (Locke, 1996; Nussbaum, 1994). Indeed this core belief is celebrated, 
one might say venerated, as the singular distinguishing feature of our species. With this in mind, 
touch your nose with a finger (either hand, any finger will do).7  How many touches did you experi-
ence? The normal experience is one touch. You might describe what you just did by saying: I touched 
my nose. Now, consider: How many touches did your brain process? The accurate answer is two. The 
7By limiting ourselves to just this one vivid experience we do not mean to suggest the evidence is restricted to this example. 
Indeed we elaborate the research evidence as well as add yet more self-initiated trials that you can engage yourself (Marcus, 
2013).
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electrical signals that convey touch somewhere in the body to the brain travel at approximately 76 
feet per second. It takes time for the nerve signals generated at the tip of your nose and those gener-
ated at the tip of your finger to travel to sensory cortexex in the brain. The nerve path from the nose 
to the brain is measured in inches, but that from the fingertip to the brain is measured in feet. Hence, 
the signal from the nose arrives well before the signal that arrives from the finger.
Consciousness offers the vivid sense that we have instantaneous access to the events before us, but 
this is just one example of our brains tricking us (Nørretranders, 1998). Conveniently, our brains rec-
onciles the temporal discrepancy, the two touches being displaced in time, and delivers instead the 
subjective sense of a single event. In this case, the brain uses the time before the later conscious subjec-
tive “experience” of touch to accomplish this resolution.8  The brain is not capable of magically giving 
us instantaneous access to the world. It does, however, create the illusion of instantaneous access.
The example is but one insight generated by fundamental breakthroughs in neuroscience about 
how humans experience reality. Here follow some others. First, we now know that preconscious 
sensory processing is more precise and deft in executing interactions, especially motor interactions, 
than is conscious observation (Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995). It accomplishes this deftness 
because preconscious neural activity is highly parallel and distributed in various regions of the 
brain. For example, though we experience vision as a coherent fully integrated experience, the brain 
receives the electrical signals arriving from the two retinas via the optic nerves and then sends them 
to different regions to determine object identification, movement, assign color and other attributes 
so that these can be simultaneously determined prior to convergence in brain region V1 where the 
conscious experience of sight is assembled (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Zeki, 1993). Parallel, distrib-
uted processing of sensory and somatosensory information is a general feature of the brain (Borst, 
Grégoire, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2011). It is also a fundamental feature of affective processing 
(Celeghin, Diano, Bagnis, Viola, & Tamietto, 2017).
Second, consciousness is not “higher” or “better” than the preconscious. Both are essential. One 
of consciousness’s principal purposes is to serve as an “error-correcting space” (Gray, 2004), this 
provides a vivid representational space wherein we can deliberate and plan for the future by manip-
ulating mental representations of both specific external stimuli and complex social outcomes, past 
and anticipated, without the immediate necessity of acting on those deliberations. But humans do not 
spend much of their lives guiding activities reliant on careful deliberation. Instead, most of the time 
our behavior is the result of quick routines whereby we apply well-embedded habits that have worked 
well in the past (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Gigerenzer, 
Todd, & Group, 1999; James, 1890).9  The constant monitoring of action and response is managed by 
preconscious appraisal processes (Berthoz, 1997; Jeannerod, 1997). And, when acting in that fash-
ion, consciousness helps humans explain themselves to themselves and to others and to generate 
mutually reinforcing accounts (Kunda, 1990; Rokeach, 1964). And, here, consciousness has a differ-
ent function, to foster shared purposes, including mutual affirmations about the proper way of acting 
and interacting (Graziano & Kastner, 2011; Mercier & Sperber, 2017).
Third, consciousness is much more limited than are the many capacities of preconscious pro-
cesses (Marcus, 2013). That is so because, in comparison to preconscious neural systems, con-
sciousness is slow, crude, and resource intensive. Moreover, consciousness does not have access to 
procedural memory wherein our habits of thought and action reside (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; 
Schacter, 1996).
Fourth, nonetheless, consciousness sometimes executes in a fashion we can describe as “free 
will,” but it most often does so at the instigation of anxiety (i.e., fear, see also footnote 15). Anxiety is 
8For more on consciousness as a delusion, Michael Gazzaniga’s work is very insightful (1985, 1992, 2011).
9We endorse the view that there is considerable wisdom in relying on the past to guide the present. Just not in all 
circumstances.
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the executor of the second of two types of judgment, the deliberative route. Hence passion, as Hume 
pronounced, is here also in charge.
Fifth, most recent research suggests that long-standing sharp distinctions between cognition, af-
fect, and perception are no longer tenable. As we pointed out above, the work of the brain to manage 
ongoing affairs requires information processing at a speed, deftness, and accuracy that far exceed 
the capacity of consciousness. To accomplish all that, affective processes are essential. As Siegel, 
Wormwood, Quigley, and Barrett (2018) put it:
“Feelings do more than influence judgments of what you have seen; they influence the actual 
content of perception. … Neuroscientific and behavioral studies suggest that affective feelings 
are integral to the brain’s internal model and, thus, perception. The cytoarchitecture of limbic 
regions puts affective feelings at the top of the brain’s predictive hierarchy, driving predictions 
throughout the brain as information cascades to primary sensory and motor regions.” (pp. 496; 
see also Chanes & Barrett, 2016)
Here we might offer one helpful suggestion. In the quote above you will find a number of spatial 
metaphors (e.g., in the quote above, “at the top”). If you reimagine these in temporal terms, that is to 
say, before and after, you will have a clearer insight into the import of the material presented above 
(see the first point below).
A neuroscientific theory of emotion is guided by the following axiomatic principles. First, af-
fective appraisals arise preconsciously (i.e., well before consciousness is capable of generating its 
conscious representation of the world of sensory experience). Second, affective responses are them-
selves focused appraisals.10  Third, affective appraisals provide the closest possible to real-time as-
sessments essential to multiple aspects of tactical and strategic aspects of life, notably by enabling 
more deft as well as more swiftly updating control than is offered by self-conscious mechanisms. 
This is largely because the former have direct and swift access to procedural memory while the latter 
do not (Berthoz, 1997; Gelder, De Haan, & Heywood, 2001; Jeannerod, 1997; Schacter, 1996; Squire, 
1992). Fourth, there are multiple concurrent, parallel, affective appraisals, each largely subserved by 
different neural processes (Maratos, Senior, Mogg, Bradley, & Rippon, 2012; Shenhav & Buckner, 
2014). Thus, it is common for people to experience multiple concurrent emotional states that fluidly 
report on changing conditions within the self, the external conditions then present, and the interplay 
of between self and the external world. Fifth, what people end up doing is a result of the competition 
between and resolution of these concurrent appraisals.11 
With all this in mind, how can these insights explain how people understand the world and act 
in it? We turn to that next.
The Theory of Affective Intelligence
The first political theory of emotion to fully rely on neuroscience was AIT (Marcus, 1988; 
Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). The theory of affective intelligence initially identified two dynamic 
10Neuroscientists often describe emotions as “cognitive.” However, by that term they refer simply to information processing, 
not whether that processing occurs in conscious awareness. The colloquial meaning of the word “cognition” holds that 
conscious thought is the essential component of cognition (i.e., to cogitate). Thus, neuroscientists’ use of the word often 
leads to confusion in the general public which subscribe to the older and quite different semantic meaning of the word 
“cognition.” It has not been clear which meaning cognitive appraisal theorists mean by their use of the term. Of late, many 
CA theorists treat appraisals as fast and occurring before consciousness.
11Affective Intelligence theory, in its initial formulation, identified just two appraisals, anxiety (fear) and enthusiasm. In its 
current guise, the theory identifies three such appraisals, adding aversion (anger). It is not unlikely that yet other appraisals 
will be found that warrant further expansion in the future.
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preconscious neural systems of affective appraisal. Informed by the research of neuroscientist Jeffrey 
A. Gray (1985, 1987a, 1987b) and augmented by the work of other neuroscientists (LeDoux, 1992, 
1993; Öhman, 1993; Öhman, Flykt, & Lundquist, 2000; Rolls, 1992, 1999), this two-dimension view 
of emotion lead to a substantial literature of research particularly on the role of anxiety (i.e., fear).
Later, in part stimulated by work on anger by other researchers (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; 
Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011), a third appraisal dimension was 
added (Marcus, 2002; Marcus & MacKuen, 1996; Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006). We 
make two observations: first, the name, theory of affective intelligence arrived more than a decade 
after the core research findings had already appeared in the research literature (Marcus, 1988), and, 
second, significant modifications were later made though the name of the theory did not change.
We present two Axioms that are core elements of the theory.
Axiom 1. Enthusiasm, and the later addition of anger, enable and affirm reliance on habits to 
manage the mundane recurring routines by which people manage their affairs. Each of these ap-
praisals reinforces the suitable and ongoing immediate success of those recurring habits. The first, 
enthusiasm, deals with recurring positive goal-securing thoughts and actions. The second, anger, 
deals with recurring confrontation with noxious threats.
Axiom 2.  Fear should delink people from relying on their partisan habits of thought and action. 
And, importantly, greater fear should also lead to a wide-ranging information search designed to 
identify a contemporaneous understanding of the character of the novel circumstances, identify the 
possible options to address those circumstances, and identify the possible coalitions to achieve the 
apparently best path.
On balance, the bulk of the research that the theory stimulated has been focused on information 
searching and the role of increased fear in moving people to make contemporaneous deliberative 
judgments in a manner that hews more closely to those defining deliberative citizenship (Albertson 
& Gadarian, 2015; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 
2000; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007; Suhay & Erisen, 2018; Valentino et al., 2008). Indeed, those 
offering alternative explanations (Ladd & Lenz, 2008; Lavine et al., 2012) and those affirming AIT 
(Groenendyk, 2016) retain the same focus on information gathering and deliberation. Three recent 
reviews summarize the research literature on emotions in politics (Brader & Marcus, 2013; Brader, 
Marcus, & Miller, 2011; Vasilopoulos, in press). Collectively these document the focus on informa-
tion search and on deliberation.
The theory of affective intelligence in its broadest view puts at the forefront the core claim that 
multiple affective appraisals serve to enable two approaches to judgment: (1) a default approach: 
partisan reliance on habituated practices, that is reliance on traditions, and (2) a departure from that 
default, nonpartisan open deliberation that sets aside tradition and “automaticity” for thoughtful 
assessments so as to produce, consider, and then enact new solutions to challenges poised by novel 
circumstances.
Having two approaches available is an adaption that addresses the problem that the viability of 
each mode of judgment entails a specific form of fallibility. The first, reliance on habit, presumes 
that benefits in the future can be most successfully harvested by relying on proven practices of 
thought and action. But reliance on past practices when circumstances are dramatically or rapidly 
changes can lead, at the extreme, to extinction (Darwin, 1966).
The second mode, reliance on open deliberation, presumes that the contemporary circumstances 
are sufficiently unusual to recommend setting aside proven habits for newly crafted possibilities. 
But knowing that the past is not likely to provide a template for the current circumstances is not a 
solution as to what to do. Rejecting the past enables us to more freely consider the possible solutions 
and guess as to their prospects. But here too there is a fallibility. These novel solutions, formed from 
reliance on our ability to reason, using such mechanisms as democratic institutions and public reason 
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fostered by a free press (Fishkin, 1991; Habermas, 1984), have a history of failure in part due to the 
inability of reason to fully anticipate the consequences that might follow.
Here, we detail one such instance of a failure resulting from reliance on reasoning. After the 
defeat of the Persians, the Greek alliance between Sparta and its allies and Athens and its allies 
broke down. Sparta was determined to defeat what they saw was an overweening Athens empire. 
During the opening phases of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartans had the most adept army, while 
the Athenian military had its navy. This made Athens vulnerable to land invasion. Pericles, the great 
Athenian leader, proposed a plan that violated traditional Athenian warrior codes of conduct. Instead 
of meeting the Spartan army on the fields outside of Athens, he persuaded the reluctant Athenian 
warriors to build a wall that would surround the city and the land all the way to and including their 
seaport, Piraeus. The walls prevented the Spartans from engaging the Athenians. The Spartans 
hurled insults at the Athenians to draw them out of their walled city. But, heeding Pericles, the 
Athenian warriors refused the challenge.
To sustain the Athenians now living inside the walled city, they brought all their animals into 
the city as well. The Spartans could and did burn the countryside but could not destroy the lands. 
And once the fighting season ended, the Spartan army returned to Sparta. The new strategy worked. 
Unanticipated was that this novel solution created a problem far greater. The dense city had become 
a formidable breeding ground for disease. When the plague came, it killed perhaps as many as one 
in four Athenians. Among the dead was the architect of the entire strategy, Pericles himself 
(Thucydides, 1996).12 
Innumerable modern examples of failures resulting from reliance on reason readily come to 
mind, among them: the two space shuttle disasters, the Columbia and the Challenger; the effect of 
cheap airplane travel enabling the rapid diffusion of viruses through infected passengers; the ability 
of evolution to work more rapidly among viruses and bacteria which may well overwhelm the slower 
efforts of pharmaceutical companies to produce efficacious defenses; or the too many instances of 
bridges failing because of unanticipated conditions. The best outcomes of science and technology 
have been, on balance, a great aid to human progress, but we must also acknowledge the sometimes 
grave outcomes some of those advances have generated. When humans invented and adopted a car-
bon-based economy, they gained electricity generation, production of manmade fertilizer, and phar-
maceuticals (among other valuable yields). These innovations reduce starvation, poverty, and crime. 
But with those benefits came climate change and greater risk to humans and many other species.
In sum, each approach is imperfect. Adopting either as the ubiquitous basis for decision-making 
would leave us considerably more vulnerable, though in different ways. We are better served by 
having two routes to judgment. But identifying this dual capability requires identifying when each 
route is best taken.
Let us apply this insight to citizenship. In his study of citizenship in America, Schudson (1998) 
found that in any given period there is one dominant normative conception of what is required to 
be a good citizen. More recently, discussions of citizenship in America have seen a debate as to 
what form of citizenship is best to ensure the success of democracy. On the one hand are those who 
espouse a model based on the ubiquitous capacity to be informed and act as an autonomous reason-
ing agent (Benhabib, 1996; Callan, 1997; Elster & Przeworski, 1998; Rawls, 1971, 1997). In that 
model, citizens failing to meet the requirements threaten the very heart of democratic institutions 
(Achen & Bartels, 2016; Caplan, 2007; Dahl, 1992; Somin, 2016). On the other hand are those who 
12This anecdotal example contains another lesson. Humans sought to understand disease for much of its history, seeking 
wellness through medicinal potions, religious ceremonies, sacrificial acts, and developing theories of disease that only be-
came somewhat successful when bacteria and viruses became identified in the late twentieth century. Happily for humans, 
resilience to infection was produced by nondeliberative mechanisms provided by evolution, for example, skin that is quite 
resistant to infection, the immune system, and the blood-brain barrier.
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espouse a form of citizenship based on solidarity and commitment to common causes (Rosenblum, 
2008; Sanders, 1997; Shapiro, 1999). What they each have in common is the presumption that their 
normative ideal is to be a universal standard. But as we have argued, AIT holds that each standard—
steadfast commitment to extant projects and goals and open deliberation—can hold sway at different 
times for the same individual. Citizens are better prepared by using each mode in the condition for 
which that mode is best suited. This claim makes extant accounts of citizenship, at least those that 
advance a set of uniformly applicable standards, suspect.
This also offers a new understanding of why some humans are genetically inclined to adopt a 
conservative stance while others adopt a more progressive one (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013, 
2014). It has been common to most normative understandings of democracy that an informed reason-
ing citizenry is required. Presented with the common finding that many citizens are inclined to trust 
tradition and stable order, it has been common to treat these so inclined as a form of pathological 
resistance to progress (Proulx & Brandt, 2017). AIT reimagines the role of the right and of the left 
as each are inclined to adopt one of two modes in operation because each is more adept at that one 
mode (Bernabel & Oliveira, 2017). This ensures that when the public faces challenges it will have a 
robust debate, hence making it less likely that a casually secured consensus will be adopted. But this, 
as we shall see below, overstates the influence of inclinations. The influence of affective appraisals 
of any particular threat on how best to address that threat are quite robust.
As we have documented, AIT has largely focused on precursors of judgment. In light of that, 
how does a focus on modes of judgment advance the field? We apply the principal AIT axioms to 
focus on two modes of judgment. As we, and many others, have noted, habits rely on “automatic-
ity” to swiftly enact the subtlety and deftness that the execution of habits demand (the millisecond 
interplay of action and response, interacting with the physical world, and with others). Thus, the 
capacities of anger and enthusiasm operate largely in the preconscious realm, largely playing out in 
the hidden realm of the preconscious. This leads to two hypotheses.
H1: Anger serves to launch defenses against challenges to extant core norms by those who 
threaten. And, given the importance of those norms, their protection will lead people to disre-
gard the specific benefits or costs of such actions (i.e., utility in the language of classic economic 
theory).13  And, anger will be most potent among those who are most attached to those core 
norms.
Hence, Hypothesis 1 predicts that there will be a positive interaction between anger and the 
salient political dispositions, especially under conditions of threat.
With respect to identifying novel circumstances, such circumstances are dealt with by conscious 
consideration of the merits of contemporary proposals (unaffected by partisan loyalties) and the 
possibilities of new coalitions that might better serve than fervent attachments to extant practices 
and loyalties.
H2 : Fear will lead people to disregard extant practices (practices that will likely be ill-suited 
for novel circumstances). Anxious people will thus be able to turn away from habits otherwise 
normally at play and concern themselves with the best possible outcomes.
13In this regard, this hypothesis challenges the ubiquity of prospect theory’s claim that losses will be more influential than 
gains when people make decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levy, 1992). When people are angry, they are more likely 
to disregard the possibility of losses resulting from their actions (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2001; Lerner & 
Keltner, 1996).
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Hence, Hypothesis 2 specifically predicts that the power of political dispositions will be reduced 
in the presence of fear generated by contemporary threats.
Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Two Received Wisdoms
The claim we examine is that perception of threat, a very familiar and currently widely used 
concept (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Mutz, 2018; Rosenboim, Benzion, Shahrabani, 
& Shavit, 2012), fully and satisfactorily accounts for how people react when faced with threats, 
foreign and domestic. AIT holds that people have two ways of responding to threat. They can 
understand it as familiar and noxious, best addressed by rallying the troops and launching as 
ferocious a response as necessary to eliminate it. Or, they can understand the threat as some-
thing unusual, hence better to look before you leap. AIT holds both relevant appraisals are exe-
cuted simultaneously and largely independently. Which is the more robust, at any given moment, 
will determine the course taken. We apply the model shown in Figure 2, below, to threat in 
France.14 
With respect to threat, the common view is that people feel a lot of fear or they feel less; thereby 
indicating whether the threat is high or low. In brief, threat elicits fear, and fear in turn drives people 
to support conservative policies and politicians.
AIT offers an alternative account of how preconscious emotions impact on both the substantive 
decisions people make and the process by which they make them. As such, it should be applicable 
to a very wide array of dependent variables. Here, we examine two important facets of citizenship: 
how people revise their policy preferences in light of affective appraisals of contemporary events and 
how they generate vote choice.
We begin with the often-made assertion that fear mobilizes authoritarians and those on the far 
right (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). There is a unity of understanding, including such 
works as offered by Glen Wilson (1973), Herbert McClosky (1958), and Ernst Becker (1973, 1975) 
that threat activates conservative and authoritarian dispositions.
Consideration of any other emotion in this process is often absent, though see (Green & Phillips, 
2004; Lambert et al., 2010; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006). The impulse to focus 
on a singular affective cause is a natural derivative of conventional approaches to emotion. As 
we’ve reviewed above, both attitude theory and the school of cognitive appraisal theories rest on 
the presumption that at any given moment one affective state is dominant. Hence, if people face a 
threat, they will become fearful and only fearful. Fear so dominates this narrative that it has become 
conventional wisdom that it is the only trigger of movement to the right after a crisis (Feldman 
14Here and throughout we focus on the interactive effects between the contemporaneous affective appraisals and salient 
politicized dispositions. In the interest of having a more focused presentation, here we discuss direct effects elsewhere 
(Valentino, Marcus, Foucault, & Vasilopoulos, 2018; Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, & Foucault, 
2018; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, & Foucault, 2018).
Figure 2. The downstream consequences of appraisals of fear and anger under conditions of threat.
Political
Threat
Appraisal 1: Is there uncertainty evident? -----> Greater Fear
Appraisal 2: Is there a normative violation evident? ------> Greater Anger
If yes, decrease reliance on habituated dispositions, boost 
willingness to compromise, expressly consider the circumstances 
(information search), and consider new best options.
If yes, strengthen reliance on relevant habituated 
dispositions and greater unwillingness to to compromise.
121Theory of Affective Intelligence
& Stenner, 1997; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017; 
Nussbaum, 2018; Robin, 2004).
However, according to AIT, fear is unlikely to produce such results for two reasons. First, at any 
given moment, with respect to emotion, the brain is evaluating three focused features of the environ-
ment (and the self’s capacity to engage). Thus, it is the norm for there to be three concurrent affective 
appraisals. And, second, specific to threat, as we outlined above (see Figure 2), AIT points to two 
different frequently co-occurring appraisals as pivotal in determining how people address the situa-
tion.15  If this is indeed the case, then conventional accounts are theoretically under-, and hence 
misspecified (She, Eimontaite, Dangli, & Sun, 2017).
Exploring what happens when fear increases without simultaneously accounting for the concur-
rent appraisal of normative violation, expressed by modulating levels of anger, is likely to generate 
inaccurate estimates of the impacts of fear and anger (Lerner et al., 2003). Only if affective apprais-
als were completely orthogonal—or if it could be demonstrated that one affective appraisal causally 
precedes the other—would it be valid to examine one affective appraisal without the other also being 
included in the model (on this point, see Jost, 2019). But the consequence of the appraisal of uncer-
tainty is not so much directed at impacting the substantive decision of what to choose among any 
visible options but rather to alter how we go about making that choice. Increased fear moves people 
to attend to the options presented by contending parties and their leaders and diminished influence 
of prior political preferences (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). What follows thereafter will de-
pend on how persuasive each side proves to be. It is quite possible that the right or far right may make 
what they find to be a more credible claim, in which case anxious voters may well move to the right 
(Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). But that movement is contingent on the 
merits that the newly attentive, anxious public finds in the available options.
We explore these claims by applying them to two different tasks. The first is authoritarian po-
litical preferences: When do people hold to their convictions, and when do they revise their views by 
taking advantage of new contemporaneous information? The second is voting: When do people rely 
on their political dispositions to vote for far-right parties, and candidates and when do they aban-
don them? Our theory anticipates that emotions will have the same pattern of effects with political 
attitudes and with the act of voting, regardless of the specific stimulus that evoked these emotional 
reactions. To support these claims, we present three of our recent studies that draw on French data 
using different emotional targets. Study 1 investigates the association of emotional responses to the 
state of the economy on the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. Study 2 addresses the impact 
of emotional reactions to the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks on the endorsement of authori-
tarian preferences. Study 3 assesses the influences of fear and anger stemming from the November 
13, 2015 Paris terror attacks on the 2015 French regional elections that took place four weeks after 
the attacks. In other studies, we explore similar hypotheses both in both France and in other nations 
using additional affective targets (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, & Foucault, 2019).
STUDY 1
We first present some results from a study wherein we examined how fear and anger differen-
tially mobilized right-wing voters to vote for the Front National in the 2014 European parliamen-
tary election (Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017). France, at that time, was wrestling with a stagnant 
economy, chronic high unemployment, and government debt that exceeded EU requirements. The 
15The earlier work in the AIT vocabulary described one of the two dimensions by the term “aversion.” Others, notably 
Valentino and Banks (Banks & Valentino, 1999; Valentino et al., 2008), have used anger to name this same dimension. We 
adopt the latter term as better suited to label this dimension. The underlying neural process is the same (Harmon-Jones, 
2004).
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Socialist government led by President François Hollande had record low approval ratings, but the 
major opposition party, the UMP (since renamed Les Republicains), was bedeviled by scandals and 
intraparty divisions. All of this served to create an opening for the Front National that its leader 
Marine Le Pen aggressively sought to exploit.
We made use of the Making Electoral Democracy Work Internet survey that was conducted in 
two French regions (Ile-de-France and Provence) generating a diverse sample of respondents that 
matched census figures on a variety of demographic dimensions. We compared voters of the Front 
National with voters of the far-left Front de Gauche, the center-left Parti Socialiste, the center-right 
UMP, and those who chose to vote for any other party. We excluded nonvoters from the analysis. We 
made use of affective appraisals of the French economy. Fear and anger toward the economy were 
each measured by two 5-point Likert scale items ranging from “not at all...” to “quite....” As with any 
threat stimulus, we expect that fear and anger will be concurrent pertinent appraisals (MacKuen et 
al., 2010; Marcus, Neumann, & MacKuen, 2017; Marcus et al., 2006). They are here, as elsewhere, 
highly correlated (r = 0.63; p <.001).
Our prediction is that fear and anger will alter how people make use of their political dispo-
sitions. Elsewhere we have explored a number of available political habits, but here we will focus 
on just one, left-right political identification, which is considered the key psychological anchor of 
French voters (Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, Chiche, & Tiberj, 2006; Fleury & Lewis-Beck, 1993).
Recall that we predict that increased fear will diminish the impact of political dispositions of 
thought and action, while we predict that anger will strengthen those same dispositions, in this anal-
ysis, ideological identification.
Figure 3 shows that as French citizens move from low to high levels of fear, center-right and 
left-wing respondents become more likely to vote for the FN. However, these differences are not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the right-hand side of Figure 3 clearly suggests that anger 
increases the impact of far-right ideological identification on the probability of voting for the FN 
Figure 3. The effects of fear and voting on ideological identification and the vote for the Front National, 2014. Source : 
Making Electoral Democracy Work project (MEDW). [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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in the 2014 European election. When anger is at its minimum, ideological identification has a very 
limited impact on voting for the FN. As we move from low to high levels of anger, however, right-
wing respondents become significantly more likely to vote for the FN. On balance then, a modest 
affirmation.
STUDY 2
Our second study also enables us to test our two central hypotheses. Here we took advantage of 
the CEVIPOF barometer of political confidence (Baromètre de la Confiance Politique).16  A wave of 
the survey had been planned to go in the field when the Charlie Hebdo attacks took place. On the 
Monday following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, one of the authors was invited to submit a measure to 
gauge the emotional reactions of the French population. Full details are available in Vasilopoulos et 
al. (2018).
The survey produces a diverse sample matching the population on an array of demographic 
variables and consisting of 1,524 respondents in two waves, one prior to the Charlie Hebdo attacks 
and one three weeks after. Data were collected by the use of Computer Assisted Web Interview 
(CAWI). The dependent variable is a scale consisting of all available items in our study that measure 
adoption or rejection of authoritarian policy preferences. Each of these items were measured using 
4-point response options, with higher values indicating greater support for the authoritarian option 
on each of the four policies.17  The four items, which we combine into a single summated scale, are:
1. “The death penalty should be restored in France”;
2. “France should have a strong leader who does not have to worry about elections or the
3. parliament”;
4. “There are too many immigrants in France”; and,
5. “The army should run the country.”
In this study, we take advantage of the panel nature of the data to gauge individual-level changes 
in authoritarian preferences as a result of the public’s affective appraisals of the terror attacks. We 
employed this method because we anticipate that—as is typically the case with political attitudes—
authoritarian preferences after the attacks are shaped by attitudes respondents held before the attacks 
as well as by the impact of the attacks themselves. We begin by presenting the proportion of the 
people in this study feeling fearful and angry. As Figure 4 clearly shows, the French report being 
fearful, but even more so, they report feeling angry.
How do fear and anger condition the impact of ideology on attitude change? Figure 5, below, 
shows that it was those on the left who were fearful who moved to adopt authoritarian policies, poli-
cies they normally reject, while those on the right who were angry were moved to marshal yet greater 
support for policies that they normally find quite genial.
In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the Socialist government of Hollande proposed 
stricter security measures, thus signaling to their supporters that they should similarly support such 
a move (Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). And, as shown in Figure 5, the left pane, it was the fearful among 
them that made that switch. But, as we show below, in Study 3, our claim that this bifurcated re-
sponse, fear leading to open-mindedness and anger leading to mobilization of the like-minded loyal 
to their convictions, is not restricted to ideological convictions nor is it restricted to resistance and 
change of public opinion.
16The Baromètre is a regularly recurring survey of French public opinion overseen by Sciences Po’s research laboratory, 
Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF).
17The response options range from “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” As with all other mea-
sures, we rescaled the scoring of this measure to a common 0–1 range.
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Figure 5. Fear and anger interactions with left-right ideological orientation. Source : Baromètre de la Confiance Politique 
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Figure 4. Proportions of the French who felt fearful and who felt angry in response to the Charlie Hedbo attacks. Source : 
Baromètre de la Confiance Politique. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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STUDY 3
Study 3 focuses on the 2015 National Regional Elections in France that took place just a few 
weeks after the November 13 Paris terror attacks. The data come from the first two waves of the 
French Election Study (Enquête Électorale Française), a panel study which executed a new wave 
approximately every month between November 2015 and the French legislative elections that took 
place in June 2017. The survey was conducted between November 20 and November 29, 2015 (Wave 
1) and between January 22 and February 3, 2016 (Wave 2) using CAWI in a nationwide representa-
tive sample of 24,369 respondents—20,460 of which participated in both waves. The dependent 
variable is the reported vote in the first round of the 2015 French regional elections, measured in 
wave 2. In the first round of the French regional elections, French citizens voted for a party candidate 
to serve as the regional president. In the 2015 election, along with the FN candidates, voters could 
choose from the four major French political parties, namely the far left Parti de Gauche (“PdG”), the 
incumbent center-left Parti Socialiste (“PS”), and the center-right Les Republicains (“Republicains”). 
In addition, they may vote for a variety of minor parties (scored as “Other”), or abstain (“Abstained”).18 
All of the independent variables were measured in Wave 1. We measure emotional reactions to 
the terror attacks using the approach proposed by Marcus et al. (2017). In Wave 1, the level of fear is 
measured by three questions, tapping the extent to which respondents felt anxious, fearful, or fright-
ened when reflecting on the November 13 attacks.19  They do so by recording their response using a 
10-point scale that ranged from “not at all” to “extremely.” A fear scale is constructed by summing 
across the three anxiety items. Details on this and all other measures in Study 3 can be found in the 
relevant publication (Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). Anger reactions are measured in a similar way. For 
fear, the exact terms in French were inquiétude, peur,  and effroi ; for anger, the French terms used 
were colère, haine, amertume,  and ressentiment .20 
We measure authoritarianism using the child-rearing values scale (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; 
see also Federico, Fisher, & Deason, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hetherington & Suhay, 
2011; Stenner, 2005). The scale asks respondents whether it is more important for a child (1) to be 
independent or respectful for his/her grandparents; (2) to have an enquiring mind or to be well man-
nered; (3) to be well-behaved or creative; and (4) to be obedient or autonomous. Ideological identifi-
cation has been measured by an item asking respondents to place themselves on an 11-interval scale 
ranging from 0 ( far left ) to 10 ( far right ). Finally, our models include the relevant demographic char-
acteristics to see if those characteristics, here, perform much as they have in prior research. Hence, 
we include measures for age, gender, social class, and education. All variables are coded to range 
from 0 to 1 so as to enhance comparability of coefficients and hence of effect size.
18The sample is quota-controlled for age, gender, professional status, and stratified by region and size of community. The 
study was conducted for the Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po by the polling institute IPSOS MORI and was 
sponsored by the French Ministry of the Interior.
19Having multiple items for each dimension is a vital step in the proper measurement of any latent concept, and no less so 
for measuring affective responses (Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuch, Wilczynski, & Kaiser, 2011; Sullivan & Feldman, 
1973). But apart from the usual psychometric considerations of establishing reliability and validity, there is the further 
benefit of dealing with the suggestion that anxiety and fear are different emotions. For whatever their semantic meanings 
might offer on that score, the failure of these items to differentiate as people describe how they feel is telling (Marcus et al., 
2017). Also available in these data are multiple indicators of enthusiasm. Including these in these analyses does not alter the 
results reported.
20It is worth noting that we have long been using hatred and anger as two of the four markers of the anger appraisal. Some 
have argued that anger and hatred are different in kind, that is, each is a distinct affective state (Halperin, Russell, Dweck, 
& Gross, 2011). Yet in dozens of studies, those described here, as well as others in various nations (United States, France, 
Germany, and Norway), these two items prove to be essentially synonyms, that is, people use both terms to make the same 
determination: how noxious they feel about the target (Marcus et al., 2017; Neuman, Marcus, & MacKuen, 2018).
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Figure 6 presents the affective responses to the November 13th Paris attacks. The results—as 
was the case with the Charlie Hebdo attacks—suggest that the attacks generated a high degree of 
both fear and anger.
Let’s turn next to our main hypotheses. We advance the argument that affective appraisals 
change the extent to which we rely on our dispositions. In Study 3, we rely on two dispositions: 
ideology and authoritarianism. As we mentioned earlier, ideology is the key dispositional variable 
explaining vote choice in France, while Vasilopoulos and Lachat (2018) have also found that au-
thoritarianism runs high among French far-right voters. The “normal vote” model’s central axiom 
is that political habits endure, that is, authoritarians and those who identify with the far right will 
vote for the far right regardless of the situation. Here, we test the indirect effects of fear and anger 
on the standing voting habits of voters. The results for left-right ideological identification are shown 
in Figure 7.
Both hypotheses are supported by the empirical patterns in the figures. Fear reduces voting for 
the Front National among center-right and especially among far-right party identifiers. As their fear 
mounts, far-right voters show less loyalty to their party. On the other hand, anger increases support 
most among far-right party identifiers. Thus, those most inclined to vote for the far right, the FN, 
those with established loyalties find that fear weakens that loyalty while anger strengthens those 
same loyalties. At the same time, results show anger mobilizing the far left and center left to vote 
for the far right, yet to a lesser extent. Overall, we find that ideology displays its maximum effect on 
voting for the FN at the highest levels of anger. This is in line with our expectations.
When we turn to the second influential predisposition, authoritarianism, we see yet again the 
same pattern. As shown in Figure 8, below, fear decreases the propensity to vote for the FN both 
among those scoring high and those scoring low on authoritarianism while those who are authoritar-
ian and angry about the Paris attacks become more likely to vote for the FN in the regional elections 
of 2015.
Overall, the evidence above suggests that people react to threat by ascertaining how novel is 
the threat and, in parallel, how noxious is the threat. These are two fundamental properties. The 
evidence from neuroscience on the generation of such answers is that they are differentially, not 
Figure 6. Affective responses to the Paris Attacks: fear and anger. Source: Enquête électorale française [Color figure can 
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
mean of fear mean of anger
127Theory of Affective Intelligence
Figure 7. Indirect effects of fear and anger on left-right dispositions and voting for the FN 2015 national elections. Source : 
Enquête électorale française. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Figure 8. Indirect effects of fear and anger on authoritarianism and voting for the FN 2015 national elections. Source : 
Enquête électorale française. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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sequentially, determined (Paulus et al., 2010; Whalen et al., 2004, 2001). This suggests that using 
such concepts as “perceptions of threat” with responses presumed to be a singular dimension, run-
ning from low to high, obscures the differentiated ways the human brain actually appraises threat.
A new study examined a diverse sample of 50 news stories. The stories all captured substantial 
public attention. They ranged from feel-good stories (e.g., the safe landing of a wounded plane in the 
Hudson River; the successful rescue of Chilean miners) to celebrity stories (golfer Tiger Woods’s car 
accident) but also included major political stories (abortion controversy in Kansas; Obama’s inau-
guration). Using the same methodology to measure emotional responses to the 50 stories as we use 
here, each of these stories shows that these three emotional appraisals are active responses to each 
and every one of the stories. The results showed dramatic affective responses on each of the three 
affective appraisals. Hence, well beyond just threat stories, all stories were appraised as to whether 
they are familiar or not (fear), how they confirm success of important goals (enthusiasm), and how 
much or how little any noxious challenge is present (Neuman et al., 2018). Thus, these three affective 
appraisals appear to be ubiquitously active across most circumstances. And this suggests that anger’s 
function and influence has been understated, and fear’s function and influence been overestimated.
Discussion
We began with a frequently used quote from David Hume. We end with an equally telling quote 
from Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes begins his book, the Leviathan , with a review of human nature as he 
understood it. Hobbes (1968) identifies a crucial feature, a sense humans’ lack. He writes:
For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they 
are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. (p. 97)
All species, in so far as we know, also lack foresight. That makes all species vulnerable to un-
foreseen events (a new predator, a new disease, changing climate, and more). While evolution has 
not, as yet, produced the capacity for foresight, it has generated, for humans, a “next best” solution. 
Humans have the capacity to make efficient use of fast preconscious appraisals to apply the rich 
inventory of past practices (some encoded genetically, some encoded in cultures, and some secured 
through life experience—most of these being hidden from introspection). And when reliance on 
that inventory is failing, the affective appraisals, enthusiasm for reward-seeking actions, and anger 
for punishment management signal such by lowering of those appraisals. Then, either greater effort 
can be marshaled or the matter resolved by abandonment. Additionally, humans have an alternative 
approach to judgment. When fear signals a novel circumstance, then the mode of decision-making 
changes to thoughtful deliberation. Each mode is fallible, just in different ways; each is adept, but in 
different circumstances. And, managing the lack of foresight is of at least equal importance to how 
people respond to reward and punishment.
The long dominant view presents the public as largely ignorant and generally, if not equally, 
available to elite manipulation (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993; Kornhauser, 1959; Sartori, 1987). But 
this view presumes that thoughtful informed deliberation is the sole means for judgment. This pre-
sumption, if valid, would indeed require an informed and deliberating citizenry (Benhabib, 1996). 
And, on this score, the argument ranges between those optimistic about democracy (Fishkin, 2009), 
to those more dubious (Mueller, 1999), and, to those downright declaring defeat (Caplan, 2007; 
Somin, 2016). But as we have presented, AIT describes two forms of judgment, one that does rely on 
deliberative consideration relatively freed from partisan loyalties and one that relies on habituated 
practices that store past success for future use. We hope that our theoretical perspective provides a 
new view of this ancient battle between those arguing for more democracy and those arguing for less. 
Each mode of judgment has its advocates: those who advance the value of deliberation (Habermas, 
129Theory of Affective Intelligence
1984; Rawls, 1971, 1997) and those who advance the value of steadfast loyalties to achieving partisan 
goals (Rosenblum, 2008; Shapiro, 1999).
The operation of the two approaches to political judgments have been largely hidden because 
their initiation occurs before consciousness and, hence, is largely invisible to us as conscious indi-
viduals. It might be useful to juxtapose AIT against the long-established influential model of voting: 
the “normal vote” model. Phil Converse (1962, 1964, 1966), many years ago, offered a succinct 
summary: “The election outcome in the population, or subpopulations, can be construed as the re-
sult of short-term forces acting on the distribution of partisan loyalties which have characterized the 
population” (1966, p. 15).
It is, at heart, a very simple account.
Axiom 1: People have habituated dispositions which serve as recurring reliable guides to thought 
and action (partisan identification and later ideological identification).
These provide the “normal vote”: the vote that results from those with left inclinations voting 
left and those with right inclinations voting right. But, as happens, incumbents lose and challeng-
ers win, ruling parties and coalitions on occasion lose strength and are replaced by challengers 
(Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Sundquist, 1973). The “normal vote” model includes a situational com-
ponent to account for these swings. Hence,
Axiom 2: It is the weakest identifiers who abandon their comfortable homes for new alliances 
when “short-term forces” blow them off their weak moorings.
The “normal vote” model sees the public as responding to the current environment (Converse, 
1966) and as largely driven by elite opinion (Zaller, 1992). As we have sought to make clear, we have 
two disagreements with this and other such accounts. First, we begin by rejecting the view of the 
public as driven by external and historical forces and replacing that with an account premised on 
self-enacting agency. Second, we also reject the view that situational circumstances and claims are 
uniform in their direction and uniform in their impact. As our results show above, much depends on 
whether a given circumstance evokes greater fear or greater anger.
We began this section by noting that there has been an enduring debate between those who 
view the public as passive and ill-informed (Achen & Bartels, 2016) and those who view the public 
as active and capable (Fishkin, 2009). To this point, neither side has given way. The opposing views 
seem irreconcilable because their theoretical formulations provide no visible basis for a plausible 
reconciliation.
AIT provides a foundation for reconciling those seemingly mutually exclusive accounts. It does 
so by recognizing that each mode of decision-making should be understood as a form of agency, but 
further, that each has recurring fallibilities. And humans, by having the dual capacity to habituate 
and to reflect, secure a more robust stance to collective action in an often but not always uncertain 
world.
Ramifications
Several accounts focus on the role of public fear in generating support for the far right by mo-
bilizing those with authoritarian or right-wing political orientations. In particular, these accounts 
rest on a presumed dynamic. Those who hold conservative attitudes and far-right partisan loyalties 
are even more prone to support conservative and far-right parties and candidates because they are 
especially responsive to fear. We argue that this account is flawed in its singular focus on fear as 
the key psychological mechanism. It might seem unusual to focus on a “micro” psychological model 
when engaging in a comparative study of elections; however, the pattern we have gleaned from data 
already secured and analyzed suggests that this well-established model is misspecified. Or to put the 
matter more frontally, fear does not have the effects that the above narrative claims. It is anger that 
plays that role. Fear does alter how people think and act, but in ways that are contrary to this account.
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As we pointed out at the outset, politicians and journalists, as well as scholars and pundits, treat 
threat and fear as equivalent and of singular potency. But that discourse largely ignores the role of 
anger. But it is anger rhetoric that also describes an important social dynamic as people respond to 
a threat. When leaders encourage people to deliberate, they talk about how the public should not be 
so afraid (all we have to fear is fear itself; fear-mongering is bad, etc.). The implicit lesson is citizens 
need not be fearful. The explicit claim then becomes if only citizens knew better they would not be 
so afraid. But many politicians, perhaps more so on the right, are not actually stoking fear at all, and 
their constituents are not dominated by fear. Our theory and findings suggest that in these circum-
stances, many are more outraged. Addressing those who are angry, on the false understanding that 
they are fearful, is likely to exacerbate their anger. Moreover, resolving imputed fears is unlikely to 
be effective because such fears do not directly address their grievances.
This narrow focus on fear is also well established outside the scholarly academy much as it 
is within. In a recent article on the Huffington Post site, a contributor, Brooke Deterline, in a post 
entitled “the United States of Anxiety” asserts the following (Deterline, 2017): “[the characteristics 
of the anxious brain]:
• Safety seeking 
• Self- and/or group-focused – I/We matter and You/They don’t
• Tunnel vision – everything rides on this situation, it’s everything
• Need to know – ambiguity feels unsafe and often unbearable
• Zero-sum game – “either/or” thinking versus imaginative of new possibilities
• Simplicity seeking – Things are simple and knowable
• Rigid and certain – “I/We know the right answer.” There is no doubt
• Black and white thinking : “I/We are right/good; You/They are wrong/bad”
• Familiarity – my group is what matters and is safe
• Fixed mindset – this situation, person, dynamic will never change
• Harmony – we all need to agree and conform, loyalty above all else.”
Actually rather than being characteristics of people who are anxious, these are characteristics 
of angry people.
What we “know” can blind us, especially when certainty of belief infuses what we think we 
know. The failure to recognize anger even when readily visible or clearly expressed is evident both 
in academic and nonacademic settings. Noted conservative Joseph de Maistre (1977) was hardly 
opaque when he expressed his hatred of the enlightenment, nor have most conservative commenta-
tors been less clear since. It is a reflection of the limits of the extant theoretical and cultural lens that 
people looking where the theoretical light falls and not elsewhere.
Another indicator of this deep commitment to the presumption that it is fear that drives all that 
is negative is revealed by examining our language. We have ample words to identify specific forms 
of fearfulness: xenophobia (fear of others), Islamophobia (fear of Muslims), and homophobia (fear of 
gay people). Yet we do not have the equivalent words for the more likely sources of the disparage-
ment to people of color by white people; the disparagement by some towards Muslims; or, towards 
gay people by social conservatives. Our theory and the findings we report here point to anger as the 
critical source of action targeting others. Hence, it would be more apt to say that we are observing 
the impact of xenocholera, Islamocholera, or homocholera, hatred of others, hatred of Muslims, and 
hatred of gay people. It appears that anxiety is not the predominant source of demands for revenge, 
limitations on immigration, enhanced security, and more authoritarian rule—it is anger. And that is 
reflected in the available name we give to those who hold women in contempt, “misogynists.” This 
term properly has its foundation in the Greek root of hatred (misein ). Perhaps, alternatively to our 
suggestion above, we could coin the terms: “misoxenoist,” “misoIslamist,” or “misohomoist.” No 
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doubt, both variants will sound so very strange to the ear, reflecting how much we rely on familiar 
terms (even those that mislabel and mislead).
This misattribution leaves those who subscribe to the conventional account helpless in the face 
of a confusing world. In a recent Atlantic article, entitled “People Voted for Trump Because They 
Were Anxious, Not Poor,” Atlantic staff writer, Olga Khazan, after summarizing recent social sci-
ence studies of Trump voters, concluded (Khazan, 2018):
These why-did-people-vote-for-Trump studies are clarifying, but also a little bit unsatisfying, 
from the point of view of a politician. They dispel the fiction—to use another 2016 meme—that 
the majority of Trump supporters are disenfranchised victims of capitalism’s cruelties.
In other words, it’s now pretty clear that many Trump supporters feel threatened, frustrated, and 
marginalized—not on an economic, but on an existential level. Now what?”
This helplessness is revealed in that last despairing concluding line: “now what?”
But conventional wisdom, here as it often does elsewhere, keeps us blind to that which lies out-
side its vision of fear as the essential and singular cause of our discontent. Anger has long been ap-
parent in the reactions to various progressive projects, such as continued population movement from 
rural areas to urban, increasing cosmopolitan patterns (cultural exchange, interest in style, fashion, 
and celebrity, as well as trade, travel, and so on), acceptance of previously disparaged groups (such 
as single women, women in the workplace, gay marriage, atheists, and more).21  Yet, as we show 
above, the misattribution of the consequences of anger to anxiety is dominant in coverage and inter-
pretation (Deterline, 2017; Mutz, 2018; Nussbaum, 2018). This in spite of scholars in psychology and 
political science who call attention to the distinction between anxiety and anger (Banks, 2014; Banks 
& Valentino, 2012; Lerner et al., 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus, 2002; 
Valentino et al., 2011; Vasilopoulos, 2018). It is worth mentioning that calling attention to the differ-
entiation is not exactly novel (Ax, 1953; Conover & Feldman, 1986). We make this point to note that 
theoretical lenses focus attention to what is within their range. When anger is the dominant motivat-
ing force, then policies, programs, and political rhetoric meant to assuage fear are unlikely to suc-
ceed. Instead, policies addressing fear are likely to be seen as impotent, hence conveying a sense of 
a political order that is in disarray and ineffectual. And that in turn will produce a hunger for new 
“outsiders” to take the reins of power from ineffectual elites. Anger springs from the sense that core 
values and core habits of thought and action are under attack. In democratic societies, people will 
differ as to what core values and social practices are just. Thus, we see the continuing fights over 
male supremacy versus female liberation; nativist dominance versus greater respect for marginal and 
liminal groups; rural dominance versus urban and cosmopolitan practices of life and authority.
In such instances, a political order that cannot address the competing claims made by contend-
ing angry groups will be more vulnerable to leaders proposing authoritarian governance. This will 
be especially so for any political regime that does not accurately recognize the angry forces at play. 
But the fuller story begins with the ability of pro-democracy liberal politicians to rally the public by 
presenting programs that offer them a richer future.
We and others have extended this work to apply this approach to attitudes and to political be-
havior (Lambert et al., 2010; Vasilopoulos, 2018; Vasilopoulos et al., 2018; Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 
2017). But much more remains to be done to exploit this approach, not just to determine its reach but 
also to identify its limitations.
21Indeed, any grasp of the history of American politics must begin with the enduring fight between those who seek to secure 
the rural modalities of life against the appeal and seduction of urban life.
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